NOTES

Sex Discrimination in Newscasting
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1 customer preference is generally not a justification for sexually discriminatory employment decisions. 2 According to one court, "[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of customers to determine whether ... sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome." 3 Thus an international corporation cannot refuse to hire a female officer, despite its claim that it will lose its South American client base. 4 Similarly, an airline cannot refuse to hire men because its passengers prefer female stewardesses, 5 and an armored car company cannot refuse to hire female drivers because its customers feel that only men give the aura of security. 6 Current practice in the television industry, however, continues to incorporate public preference into employment decisions through the use of viewer surveys, 7 which measure viewer reactions to individual [Vol. 84:443 newscasters. 8 The public, according to many media personnel, evaluates female newscasters by different criteria from those used to judge their male counterparts. 9 In response to perceived public expectation, networks treat them differently as well. This different treatment does not stem from the usual form of customer preference stereotypethat the public prefers men over women in the job. 10 Instead, it arises from the perception of television broadcasters that the public prefers women with certain traits -for example, youth, 1 1 beauty, 12 and nonaggressive behavior 13 -but that the public does not demand these qualities of male newscasters, or at least not to the same degree as of women. 14 This type of discrimination among members of one sex 15 based upon impermissible 16 stereotyped expectations is called sex-plus 8 . Viewer surveys can be done on paper, over the phone, or in person in "focus groups,"
where viewers react to videotapes of specific newscasters. These surveys are used to predict movements in the ratings by identifying audience preference. See Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 876.
Viewer surveys are to be distinguished from ratings. Two private companies, Arbitron and Nielson, measure audience size or "ratings," issuing ratings several times a year in a publication known as the "ratings book." Advertisers place ads according to the ratings in order to reach the largest share of their desired market. Consequently, small changes in the ratings translate into substantial increases or decreases in station revenue. See Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 876.
Like viewer surveys, ratings should not provide a means to evade the requirement that a television station not cater to sex-stereotyped customer preference in newscasting employment decisions. However, ratings present a more difficult proof problem because they do not measure responses to individual newscasters and thus tend to blur sex-role expectations. See N.Y. Times, supra note 9 ("It is a fact oflife that men have an easier time of it in this business in terms of aging than women do.") (quoting the president of a news consulting firm).
Id. ("[Appearance is
] a heck of a lot more of a factor in hiring a woman than a man.") (quoting a news consultant); see also Bar- 407 (1980) (a woman forced to conform to role expectations is "doomed to play a part in reinforcing the vitality of such criteria in her own eyes, the eyes of other women, and in the eyes of her employer and co-workers").
16. Not all sex-stereotyped expectations are impermissible as the basis of employment actions under title VII. Some grooming requirements will survive title VII scrutiny. See notes 52-59 infra and accompanying text; Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir.
1977) ("Employer grooming codes requiring different hair lengths for men and women bear such a negligible relationship to the purposes of Title VII that we cannot conclude they were a target of the Act.").
discrimination. 17 It is as much a violation ohitle VII as discrimination that prohibits an entire sex from performing the job. 18 Basing newscaster employment decisions on public preference is potentially discriminatory. However, courts have failed to question the use of viewer surveys, 19 which employers use to measure this preference. 20 For example, in Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 21 Christine Craft alleged that her treatment 22 while employed as co-anchor of the nightly news at KMBC-TV in Kansas City, Missouri, as well as her subsequent demotion 23 19. It makes no difference that the viewer preference is not speculative but is, in fact, documented in the form of a survey. In the seminal case rejecting customer preference as a defense to discrimination in employment, Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), 
1980). In
Goodman, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that she was dismissed because of her pregnancy and pointed to viewer survey findings that she lacked requisite on-air personality. The court in
Haines rejected a male television anchor's claim that he was dismissed because he helped his wife in a title VII suit against the station. The court found that the station based its dismissal on the results of a viewer survey, which the court admitted was open to legitimate challenge due to its subjectivity; it refused, however, to examine whether viewer surveys could permissibly be used in employment decisions. In these cases, the finding that the employment action was based on a viewer survey effectively dispelled the inference that the employment decision was due to the particular condition or action. Nevertheless, both courts appeared to assume that viewer surveys and ratings are unconditionally legitimate employment criteria. 22. Craft contended that the appearance standards imposed upon her were more harsh than those imposed upon men. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1210. These requirements included extensive makeup counseling and a "clothing calendar" to insure that Craft did not wear the same outfit more often than once every three weeks. 766 F.2d at 1209, 1214; Henry, supra note 9, at 57; see Plaintiff's Conclusions of Law at 40, Craft ("Plaintiff's performance was judged exclusively or to a significant extent according to her appearance while male newscasters were judged primarily or entirely based upon their journalistic skills and abilities."). But see Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact at 20, Craft ("There was no policy of harassment of female on-air newscasters because of their appearance. . . . Male on-air newscasters were also criticized on appearance, dress, and makeup.").
23. Craft was reassigned to the position of reporter. As well as alleging a title VII violation, she also claimed that the reassignment constituted a constructive discharge. According to the trial court, this contention was "untenable on both the law and the facts." Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 879. The trial court found that the evidence did not support a finding that either of the elements of constructive discharge were present. Plaintiff's working conditions did not become so intolerable that she had no choice but to leave, nor were any of defendant's actions taken with the intent to force plaintiff's resignation. 572 F. Supp. at 876, 879. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling that Craft was not constructively discharged. The appellate court refused to rule that the district court was "clearly erroneous" in finding that, as a matter of fact, Craft [Vol. 84:443 tion 24 in violation of title VII. Metromedia argued that Craft's treatment and demotion were legitimately based on viewer surveys indicating that she was negatively perceived by the Kansas City audience. 25 Without considering whether the surveys themselves reflected impermissible sex stereotypes, the district court found reliance on them "reasonable and appropriate" 26 and the resulting employment actions nondiscriminatory. 27 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit treated this determination as a finding of fact and upheld it as not clearly erroneous, 28 thus refusing to reach beyond the confines set by the district court and question the propriety of using viewer surveys to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. 29 This Note argues that the current judicial deference 30 to viewer surveys used by television stations in newscasting employment decisions is unwarranted. Part I explores how different treatment of wohad not been subjected to illegal discrimination or that the defendant had not acted with an intent to force her to resign from her job. 766 F.2d at 1217.
24. According to Craft, she was told by the KMBC news director that she was being re· moved from her co-anchor position because she was "too old, too unattractive, and not deferen· tial to men." Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 878. The court of appeals accepted the district court's factual conclusion that the news director "said no such thing." 766 F.2d at 1212.
Sex discrimination was only the first count in Craft's complaint. Count II alleged that de· fendant paid her less than similarly situated male employees in violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982) . The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's acceptance of the jury verdict against Craft on her Equal Pay Act claim. Craft also alleged that the defendant made intentional, fraudulent misrepresentations to induce her to accept employment. The district court set aside a jury award for Craft on this claim on the ground that it was excessive, and awarded a new trial. 572 F. Supp. at 881. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Craft had failed to establish an adequate case on the fraud count. 766 F.2d at 1207-08. Finally, Craft alleged that the defendant's actions toward her, even if otherwise lawful, were intended to injure her and therefore constituted a prima facie tort. This count was abandoned during the trial and was not submitted to the jury. 572 F. Supp. at 870.
25. The defendant argued that the station controlled Craft's wardrobe and makeup because the reaction of "focus groups" to her appearance was "overwhelmingly negative." Craft, 766 F.2d at 1209. The station later reassigned Craft because a subsequent survey found her trailing her competitors. 766 F.2d at 1209.
26. 572 F. Supp. at 873. 27. 572 F. Supp. at 876. Craft alleged a claim of disparate treatment, which required her to prove discriminatory intent on the part of her employer. See note 66 infra and accompanying text. Since the court found "no evidence that the survey was designed to effect the removal of plaintiff as co-anchor because of her sex or any other reason," 572 F. Supp. at 878, Craft was unable to establish the requisite intent. The district court thus disregarded a jury recommenda· tion that it rule for plaintiff, 572 F. Supp. at 870 (on a title VII claim the jury may sit only in an advisory capacity, FED. R. C1v. P. 39(c)), and held that Craft had no cause of action under title VII.
28 men newscasters constitutes sex-plus discrimination. Part II demonstrates that viewer surveys almost always reflect sexual stereotypes that are impermissible under title VII, and argues that such surveys should be presumptively inadmissible as evidence to rebut a claim of sex discrimination. Indeed, mere use of these surveys may in and of itself establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Part III contends that sex discrimination in the news industry resulting from the use of viewer surveys cannot be justified under any of the recognized title VII defenses. Part IV discusses the policy considerations involved in the use and scrutiny of viewer surveys. It concludes that if courts are unwilling to prohibit the use of surveys generally as discriminatory per se, they should at least subject particular surveys that are challenged as discriminatory to judicial scrutiny. The courts that have required the plus factor to be a fundamental right or immutable characteristic have also mentioned that the determining element of an employment requirement is its effect on job opportunity. These courts found that only immutable characteristics or fundamental rights had a significant enough effect to warrant imposition of title VII liability. See, e.g., [Vol. 84:443 Cases involving airline requirements for flight attendants illustrate the difference between discriminating against an entire sex, on the one hand, and against only certain members of one sex, on the other. In terms of the former, an airline cannot hire only female flight attendants, even if it demonstrates that this practice is important to its image and that customers prefer that men not perform the job. 42 In terms of the latter, an airline cannot require that its female employees be unmarried, 4 3 or below a certain age, 44 subject to the same requirements. Unless uniformly applied, these two criteria constitute illegal sex-plus discrimination, i.e., discrimination against only women who possess these traits, even though not all women are disqualified by the requirements. The quintessential example of an illegal "plus factor" is a requirement that-employees not be pregnant. While facially neutral because all employees are subject to it, the requirement in fact only disqualifies women. The requirement thus discriminates among women on the basis of a sexual characteristic that, absent a health or safety rationale, 4 s cannot validly be considered. 46 Indeed, most courts have interpreted sexual stereotypes concerning ability or proper sex-role behavior to be illegal plus factors. 47 Most physical appearance requirements are also illegal under title VII. Unless a particular appearance is essential to job performance, 48 an employer cannot fire or demote an employee because she wears glasses, 49 exceeds a strict weight limit, so or refuses to wear a sexually provocative uniform.s 1 45. See, e.g., Condit v. United Air Lines, 558 F.2d 1176, 1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (airline's "gowhen-you-know" policy, which required stewardesses to discontinue flying as soon as they were aware that they were pregnant, held consistent with the carrier's duty to exercise the highest degree of care for the passenger's safety), cert. The EEOC Guidelines proscribe the following employment practices: (i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of women in general. For example, the assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher than among men.
I. SEX-PLUS
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes . . . . The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(l) (1985) .
Courts have consistently required that an individual be allowed to prove nonconformity with a sexual stereotype and thus capability for the job. Personal grooming requirements mark the current line between permissible and impermissible employment actions under title VII. Courts have upheld some grooming requirements as reasonable 52 even though they clearly enforce general community expectations regarding how a member of a certain sex will appear. For example, an employer can require that both sexes wear "proper business attire," although common societal norms interpret different types of clothing as appropriate for men and women. 53 Similarly, an employer can require male employees to wear short hair 54 or ties, 55 while not imposing the same requirement on women. However, a facially neutral standard cannot be applied more strictly to one sex than the other. 56 Furthermore, an appearance requirement cannot embody offensive 57 (1986) . However, a concrete demonstration of injury to employee job opportunity resulting from such stereotypes could reverse the "common sense" presumption. See Taub, supra note 15, at 387-88:
[Personal appearance requirements represent] a company decision to project a certain image, [however] not all images are permissible. A company presumably would not be permitted to post posters throughout its premises advertising itself as dedicated to the suppression of blacks, nor would it be able to require all Negro employees to wear blackface. The problem is thus one of recognizing how potent and how detrimental are the messages conveyed, a matter perhaps best handled on a case-by-case basis. An ad hoc approach, however, will only succeed in eliminating sex based barriers to equal employment opportunity if judicial concepts of discriminatory behavior are expanded. Documentation of the adverse effect of sexual stereotypes in the workplace should also reduce the alarmingly prevalent attitude that the dangers of sex discrimination are exaggerated and the imposition of liability somehow unfair. See Weiner, Stewart Doubts Supreme Court Ruling on Executive Privilege, HARV. L. REC., Mar. 23, 1973, at 1, 15 (" '[T]he female of the species has the best of both worlds.' ... The equal protection clause can be used to attack laws that unreasonably discriminate against women while saving some, such as exemption from conscription, which favor them.") (quoting Speech by Justice Potter Stewart at Harvard University's Lowell House (Mar. 13, 1973)); Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 879 (pointing out "one notable and ironic exception" to Craft's equal employment treatment: "but for the fact that she is female, plaintiff would not have been hired as a co-anchor ..• regardless of her other abilities").
Even prominent public officials can be heard to articulate sex-role assumptions, indicating that the seriousness of these stereotypes is still often underestimated. See, e.g., Thomas, A Reagan Crony on the Line, TIME, Jan. 9, 1984, at 20 (Director of the United States Information Agency Charles Wick stated that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher disapproved of the United States invasion of Grenada "because she is a woman.").
60. Henry, supra note 9, at 57 (quoting ABC News Vice President David Burke).
[Vol. 84:443 a factor in hiring a woman than a man," 61 and "It is a fact of life that men have an easier time of it in this business in terms of aging than women do. " 62 Finally, a female newscaster complains, "If I'm as aggressive as I think I should be in a particular situation, a lot of people get annoyed or write in and ask me, 'Don't I know how ladies behave?' " 63 These comments suggest that women news personnel are subject to different criteria than are their male counterparts. Specifically, women not meeting certain age, appearance, and demeanor requirements may lose their jobs (or not get hired at all), while men with the same characteristics do not suffer any adverse consequences. This differential treatment, if proven, should be considered a violation of title VII unless justified under one of the statute's traditional defenses. 64
B. The Prima Facie Case
There are two theories under which a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under title VII: disparate treatment and disparate impact. Which theory the plaintiff chooses will depend upon the facts of the case -on whether she wants to argue that her employer intentionally treated her differently because of her sex or, instead, that a facially neutral employment policy has an adverse impact on members of her sex.
Disparate Treatment
Under the disparate treatment theory, 65 a plaintiff must show that her employer intentionally treated her differently because of her sex or some sex-related characteristic. 66 The emphasis is on the employer's motive. The plaintiff's initial burden is not onerous. 67 To establish a prima facie case, she must merely produce sufficient evidence to support the necessary inference that "it is more likely than not that [the challenged employment decision was] 'based on a discriminatory crite-61. N.Y. Times, supra note 9, at 44, col. 1 (quoting an unnamed veteran news consultant rion illegal under the Act.' " 68 Various sorts of differences in treatment have been held sufficient to constitute a prima facie case. Thus, a newscaster may establish a prima facie case merely by showing a difference in treatment between her and a comparably situated male. More directly, she may introduce statements by her employer that exhibit discriminatory intent. Finally, she may demonstrate that an employer used a survey incorporating gender stereotypes to satisfy perceived customer preferences. 69 Given the fact that the burden is not onerous, a newscaster who is treated differently because of her sex should be able to establish her initial case merely by introducing the facts of her treatment.
Disparate Impact
The disparate impact theory 70 focuses on the consequences of a particular employment action rather than its motivation. 71 The theory was first developed in the race discrimination context, where courts realized that even facially neutral employment practices could have an adverse impact on a protected class. 72 To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff claiming sex discrimination must demonstrate that an employment practice produces a substantial adverse impact on members of her group because of their sex. Statistics show that the criteria used by decisionmakers in selecting anchors have resulted in gross underrepresentation of older women in that position. 75 Unfortunately, statistics such as these are difficult to formulate for traits more subjective than age, such as appearance or demeanor. A prima facie case is made out, however, whenever women who possess a certain trait can demonstrate with statistics that they are significantly underrepresented in a given occupation as compared to men with a similar trait.
II. THE USE OF VIEWER SURVEYS
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, her employer must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the difference in treatment if the plaintiff's theory is disparate treatment, 76 or demonstrate a business necessity for the practice if the theory is disparate impact. 77 It is at this stage of the case that defendants have responded to allegations of sex discrimination by demonstrating that their employment decisions were based on the results of viewer surveys. 78 Implicit in accepting an employer's reliance upon a viewer survey as an appropriate way to rebut a prima facie case of sex discrimination is that the survey is free from discriminatory taint. However, a viewer survey may well be discriminatory. (1973) . All the employer need do is raise a "genuine issue of fact as to whether it unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff;" it need not prove that it was actually motivated by the explanation offered. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
The great majority of disparate treatment cases will turn on the final stage of the proof process: whether or not the plaintiff can establish that the employer's purported explanation is in fact a pretext for unlawful discrimination. the sexual stereotypes of the viewers. 80 Viewer surveys that incorporate the sex-role expectations of viewers are insufficient to defend a claim of sex discrimination. 81 Indeed, the elimination of sexual stereotypes was one of the important goals of title VII. 82 Nonetheless, the few courts that have reviewed sex discrimination claims of newscasters (all of which have been disparate treatment claims) have refused to determine whether the viewer evaluations that comprise the surveys are themselves sex based, or, alternatively, to explain why the use of surveys is legitimate whether or not they reflect sex-based attitudes. 83 The district court's ruling in Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 84 as affirmed by the court of appeals, provides a ready example. In Craft, the district court deferred to the employer in two important respects. First, it noted that the defendant's emphasis on Craft's dress and make-up was the result of four "focus group" discussions, in which viewers were "overwhelmingly negative" about Craft's appearance. 85 Assuming, without analysis, that such reliance was legitimate, it upheld the defendant's actions as nondiscriminatory. The court failed to consider whether the survey itself was sex based, or whether the viewers brought sexual stereotypes to the viewings and thereby tainted the outcome of an otherwise sex-neutral survey.
The district court was also deferential toward the survey prompting Craft's demotion, finding it to be a legitimate basis for an employment decision. 86 The court's decision relied heavily on the concession of one of the plaintiff's experts that the survey was "not sex-biased." The court failed to determine, however, whether the "expert's" testimony was accurate or sensitive to the various ways in which the survey could have been discriminatory. 87 The court of appeals characterized the district court's decision of sex neutrality as one of 80. For example, a woman might be judged too aggressive by the public while a man exhibiting the same behavior would be praised. See notes 13 & 63 supra and accompanying text. A facially neutral question might also ask viewers about the appearance of television newscasters.
If these viewers deem appearance more important for women than for men, see notes 12, 38 & 61 supra and accompanying text, women who dress poorly, but who otherwise possess comparable skills, will be rated lower than men who also dress poorly. fact and affirmed. 88 The appellate court noted that Craft had scored poorly on such "sex-neutral" issues as "knowledge of Kansas City, journalism ability, and apparent enjoyment of her job." 89 However, the court failed to inquire (and failed to direct the district court to inquire) whether viewers' sex-role expectations had influenced their answers to these facially neutral questions. In addition, the appellate court ignored testimony accepted by the district court that the defendant's decision to demote Craft was based mostly on her poor ratings in such non-neutral categories as appearance and demeanor. 90 Rather than examining the possible discriminatory effect of the survey, both the district court and the court of appeals were satisfied that the survey was legitimate merely because it was not designed to cause Craft's removal on the basis of sex.9 1 The nature of widely held sex-role expectations, 92 as well as the specific observations of news personnel, 93 indicate that the sex-based stereotypes incorporated in viewer surveys are likely to go beyond those considered "reasonable" under title VIl.9 4 Thus, when the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of sex-plus discrimination, a court should not allow a television employer to rebut that prima facie case simply by showing that viewer surveys were the reason for the employment decision. The fact that viewer surveys will usually reflect these impermissible expectations should be enough to make them presumptively invalid as an employment tool, not absolutely valid as courts dealing with such surveys have apparently assumed. The burden should be on the employer to prove that the viewer survey is not sexually discriminatory. To meet this burden, employers can use so-88. Specifically, the court of appeals held that the lower court's fact determination was not clearly erroneous. 766 F.2d at 1216-17.
89. 766 F.2d at 1216. 90. In response to Craft's question concerning why she was being reassigned, the news director is reported to have replied that "the audience perceived plaintiff's dress, appearance, makeup, and presentation as stumbling blocks." 572 F. Supp. at 874. The court of appeals pointed instead to the fact that in one segment of the survey only four of the fourteen categories concerned dress or image, and that Craft trailed her competitors in nearly every category. 766 F.2d at 1209. Merely inferential, this evidence is less probative of the actual reason for Craft's demotion than the revealing statement of the news director.
91. 766 F.2d at 1216 (citing the district court's finding, 572 F. Supp. at 878). Craft's case had been framed as an intentional discrimination action. The court might also have been reluctant to examine the survey closely because the underlying sex-plus factor -appearance -falls on the border of actionable discrimination. See notes 52-59 supra and accompanying text. Had the survey asked about viewer reaction to an anchor's marital status -a clear sex-plus factorthe courts might have examined the survey more rigorously. Indeed, the nature of surveys as measures of customer preference suggests that their very use in making employment decisions might establish the plaintiff's prima facie case of sex discrimination. Unlike ratings, surveys are commissioned by the television stations themselves and elicit specific responses to individual newscasters. As a result, underlying sex-role expectations and the role of networks in catering to them are easily identified. Absent a justification for making employment decisions on the basis of customer preference and sex-based considerations, television stations, like any other employer, are prohibited by title VII from doing so.
III. THE DEFENSES
An employer should be able to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by demonstrating that its employment decision was based on a nondiscriminatory viewer survey. 99 If the employer is unable to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, however, it may seek to justify the use of the discriminatory survey under one of the two title VII defenses: the bona fide occupational qualification defense or the business necessity defense. The emphases of the two defenses mirror the different aspects of the two title VII theories. Since a newscaster may potentially establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under either of the two theories, both defenses are relevant to sex-plus discrimination against female newscasters.
A. TheBFOQ
The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) is a statutory de-95. See notes 136-39 infra and accompanying text. 96. See Taub, supra note 15, at 413 n.318 (noting that expert witnesses can draw on the available sociological research to assist courts in identifying stereotype-based employment actions).
97.
See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text.
98. Arguably, the burden should be on the plaintiff to show that the -employer's use of a survey is a pretext for sex discrimination. Under this approach, courts would continue to accept the use of surveys as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for disparate treatment or as a business necessity, and the plaintiff would have to proffer the sophisticated statistical techniques and expert testimony demonstrating that the surveys were sexually discriminatory.
While this arrangement would improve upon the completely deferential approach now taken to the use of viewer surveys, it would ignore certain realities that argue for a different allocation of burdens. As already discussed, viewer surveys, by their very nature, ordinarily incorporate sexual stereotypes. In addition, the employer surely has greater knowledge concerning the design and implementation of viewer surveys. Together, these two facts support placing the onus on the employer to show that the particular survey used is not in fact sex based, or, alternatively, that it is sufficiently job related.
See text following note 94 supra.
[Vol. 84:443 fense 100 to a prima facie claim of disparate treatment. 101 A BFOQ allows an employer intentionally to choose employees on the basis of their sex or sexual traits when those traits are necessary job qualifications.102 To take the most obvious example, an employer would admit to hiring only females for the job of wet nurse but would argue that being female is a necessary qualification for the job. 1 03
The BFOQ is recognized as a very narrow exception to title VII's general proscription of sex discrimination. 104 To establish a BFOQ defense to a prima facie case of sex discrimination, an employer must demonstrate that being of a certain sex or possessing certain sex-specific traits is necessary to perform the essence of the job. 105 This re-100. An employer may legally employ an individual on the basis of sex if sex "is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi· ness or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1982 Courts have been inexact in distinguishing between the "essence of the business" and the "essence of the job." The Court in Diaz focused on the essence of the employer's total business operation. 442 F.2d at 388. Subsequent decisions have focused primarily on the essence of the particular employment position in question. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 (holding that sex is a BFOQ for the job of security guard in a maximum security prison); Sirota, supra note 39, at 1044-45. The latter position, focusing on the essence of the job, makes more sense because different jobs within a single business require different qualifications. Sometimes the essence of the job and of the business will coincide since the job is part of the entire business operation. This was the point of the Diaz court when it held that the job of flight attendant did not require sex-based qualities because the essence of the airline business was to transport passengers. This Note will take the same approach in discussing the essence of the job of television newscaster as it relates to a television station's business operation.
quires a judicial determination of the "essence" of the particular job; 106 the employer's characterization of the job is not controlling. 107 The EEOC guidelines promulgated under title VII recognize that sex or sex-related traits 108 may sometimes constitute a bona fide occupational qualification in the entertainment industry. 109 Indeed, the 106. In Diaz, the Fifth Circuit rejected the employer's definition of the essence of the job of flight attendant as providing a pleasant environment and performing nonmechanical job functions. 442 F.2d at 388. The trial court had found on the basis of the expert testimony of a psychiatrist "that an airplane cabin represents a unique environment in which an air carrier is required to take account of the special psychological needs of its passengers. These psychological needs are better attended to by females." 442 F.2d at 387; see also A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMl~ATION § 15.31, at 4- 25 (1985) :
When the seasoned airline traveler goes on to discover that the airline case, in effect, rested on the proposition that the essential element contributed by stewardesses was a moreor-less motherly atmosphere, his smile might well break into a loud guffaw. If this is really so, he might ask, why did the airlines have a rigid policy of firing stewardesses at age 32? Why did they make any stewardess who might be inclined to gain weight step on the scales every two weeks, always with the threat of losing her job if her weight came within twenty pounds of that of the heroine of "I Remember Mama?" Above all, if her role was that of vicarious mother, why was becoming a real mother the surest way of establishing her lack of qualifications for the job? (Footnotes omitted).
107. The Diaz court found that the primary function of an airline business was "to transport passengers safely from one point to another." 442 F.2d at 388. The cosmetic and non-mechanical functions performed by flight attendants were found to be "tangential to the essence of the business involved." 442 F.2d at 388. guidelines specifically provide that an employer may discriminate on the basis of sex "[w]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness ... e.g., an actor or actress." 110 A movie director may thus discriminate against men and older women in casting the part of a sixteen-year-old girl. Only if the director is allowed this discretion will the actress be believable in her role. 111 "Authenticity or genuineness" does not mean, as a television station might argue, merely the ability to appeal to the public. Such an interpretation would establish "fulfilling customer preference" as the primary function, or "essence," of the newscasting business. Of course, catering to the public is, in a sense, the "essence" of most every successful business. Similarly, every employer has an interest in hiring employees who appeal to the public. 112 Nevertheless, title VII specifiRestaurant Employees' & Bartenders' Intl., Local 1, 74-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) ~ 8557 (1974) (Turkus, Arb.) (firing of Bunnies permitted as based not on union activity but on the contractual ground of loss of Bunny image).
An informal EEOC publication specifically recognizes the sex appeal BFOQ: "Jobs may be restricted to members of one sex ••.
[i]n jobs in the entertainment industry for which sex appeal is an essential qualification." EEOC, supra note 108, at 5. However, to constitute a BFOQ, sex appeal must be the predominant aspect of the job. See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388·89 (rejecting the airline's argument that it should be able to cater to its customers' documented preference for female flight attendants: "Before sex discrimination can be practiced, it must not only be shown that it is impracticable to find the men that possess the abilities that most women possess, but 2) (1985). This is the only exception set out in the EEOC guidelines to the general prohibition on third-party preference as a BFOQ. The guidelines provide in relevant part:
The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly ....
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception:
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers except as covered specifically in paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or actress. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1985) .
111. Even for the purpose of authenticity the BFOQ provision does not justify discrimination on the basis of race. According to Senator Clark, speaking during Senate debate on title VII:
[A] director of a play or a movie who wished to cast an actor in the role of a Negro, could specify that he wished to hire someone with the physical appearance of a Negro -but such a person might actually be a non-Negro. Therefore, the act would not limit the director's freedom of choice.
110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964), quoted in Sirota, supra note 39, at 1025 n.4.
112. Appealing employees become more important as their public visibility increases. Televi-cally limits an employer's ability to appeal to the public by prohibiting employment decisions made on the basis of sexual stereotypes. 113 Thus, the statutory BFOQ provision does not provide a blanket exception for jobs with entertainment aspects. Instead, it limits the scope of the BFOQ defense for the entertainment industry to situations in which the essence of the job is sex-based authenticity or genuineness.114 Though television news contains elements of show business, 115 its main purpose is to inform viewers. 116 Because members of sion newscasters are, of course, highly visible. Consequently, public appeal is a very important quality in a newscaster. However, the degree of public appeal is not the inquiry under title VII.
Rather, the inquiry is whether that public appeal can be legitimately sex based. Ct. 1285 (1986), however, refused to address the contention that entertainment-related factors such as appearance could be separated from a news program's informational function. In affirming the district court's finding that Christine Craft was not subject to sex discrimination based on her appearance, the Eighth Circuit wrote: "While we believe the record shows an overemphasis by KMBC on appearance, we are not the proper forum in which to debate the relationship between newsgathering and dissemination and considerations of appearance and presentation -i.e., questions of substance versus image -in television journalism." 766 F.2d at 1215.
[Vol. 84:443 both sexes are capable of transmitting information, no BFOQ justifies discrimination among newscasters on the basis of sex.
For actors and actresses in pure entertainment programs to appear genuine in their roles, they must often maintain a certain sexual appearance.117 The job of "newscaster," however, is fundamentally different. Qualities necessary to an "authentic" newscaster correlate to sexual characteristics 118 only by cultural assumption. 119 These cultural stereotypes are impermissible bases for employment decisions under title VII. 12° Furthermore, the FCC has mandated equal employ-117. Although a television station is not constrained by title VII from employing actors and actresses to portray sex-stereotyped characters on prime time entertainment programs, such per· petuation of sexual stereotypes has been severely criticized. See, e.g., D. MEEHAN, LADIES OP THE EVENING: WOMEN CHARACTERS OP PRIME-TIME TELEVISION (1983); Seggar, Television's Portrayal of Minorities and Women, 1971-75, 21 J. BROADCASTING 435 (1977) .
118. It is unlikely that a television station would argue that its female newscasters are comparable to Playboy Bunnies who may be discharged when they lose their fresh and youthful appearance. See note 109 supra. In any event, such an argument would probably not succeed, because an employer cannot define its own business for purposes of title VII. See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
119. In 1979, television consultant Frank Magid prepared a tabular breakdown of what viewers found to be "desirable anchor qualities." The survey compiled results from all over the country for both network and local newscasters. One handbook cites the following qualities: "(I) professional credentials; (2) thorough prepa· ration of significant and interesting copy and actualities; (3) authoritative, confident, credible and fluent delivery; and (4) an ingratiating manner." L. DUDEK, PROFESSIONAL BROADCAST AN-NOUNCING 90 (1982). Dan Rather argues that the most essential characteristic of a news anchor is believability:
Walter Cronkite. David Brinkley. John Chancellor. Harry Reasoner. Mike Wallace. Edwin Newman. Eric Sevareid. In looks, voice and approach no two are alike. But there is a common denominator. They are believable. No machine known to science can measure the human waves that come across the screen. But believability is the test. D. RATHER, THE CAMERA NEVER BLINKS 281 (1977). Apparently, there is a second "common denominator" in identifying successful anchors; all the anchors mentioned in Rather's quotation are men. This revealing fact illustrates how the ostensibly neutral quality of "believability" can mask society's sex-role expectations.
120. "The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the ment opportunity in the television industry. 121 Because of this FCC standard, television stations cannot exclude women entirely from the job of newscaster. The fact that either sex can fill the position of "newscaster" 1 2 2 indicates that no specifically sexual characteristics are essential to the job.123
The standards of the television industry, and the statements of its participants, underscore the differences between newscasting and pure entertainment. Television standards distinguish "news" from "entertainment," treating newscasting as requiring professional responsi- 122. One possible way to justify different employment standards for male and female newscasters would be to establish that the jobs of "male newscaster" and "female newscaster" are, in fact, different. The district court in Craft appeared to imply this distinction. It noted that KMBC chose to hire a female newscaster "to 'soften' the image of its news presentation," Craft v. Metromedia (1986) ; that viewer surveys compared Craft to the female co-anchors at the competing networks, 572 F. Supp. at 874; and that "but for the fact that she is a female, plaintiff would not have been hired as a co-anchor ... regardless of her other abilities." 572 F. Supp. at 879.
Despite these admitted differences in treatment, the Craft trial court insisted that "defendant's actions toward plaintiff during her employment at K.MBC were not based on her sex." 572 F. Supp. at 879. Thus, although the trial court implied that the role of "female newscaster" differs from that of "male newscaster," it explicitly recognized that under title VII the relevant comparison involves the treatment of all newscasters regardless of sex. 572 F. Supp. at 879 (Craft "was a 'co-equal co-anchor.' "). Accepting the trial court's version of the facts, the court of appeals affirmed, finding that "Craft was not subject to sex discrimination either in KMBC's application of its appearance standard or in its reassignment of her to reporter." 766 F.2d at 1217.
123. Sexual characteristics cannot be necessary to the job unless it is first necessary for the employee to be a member of a specific gender. For example, the implicit assumption of a requirement that an employee have large breasts is that the employee be a woman. [Vol. 84:443 bility in presentation and delivery. 124 Network executives attempt to disclaim or downplay any show business aspects in the news, as do the newscasting anchors themselves. 125 According to Bill Leonard, president of CBS News, no surveys were used in the choice of Dan Rather to succeed Walter Cronkite. 'It was "a news decision." 126 Many members of the industry now feel that "the emphasis on appearance has gone too far in local news."127
Because sex-specific traits are not necessary to the job of newscaster, 128 a television employer cannot demonstrate that sex is a BFOQ for newscasting employment decisions. Employing sex-role expectations to determine employment decisions does a disservice both to the anchor and to the American public, approximately two-thirds of which relies on television news programs as its primary source of news. 129 A television station, therefore, cannot follow an employment policy that adopts sexual stereotypes prohibited under title VII. The use of viewer surveys that embody sex-role expectations illegal under title VII is one such policy.
B. Business Necessity
Business necessity is a court-created defense to the court-fashioned doctrine of disparate impact. 130 Where a business practice results in an adverse impact on individuals because of their sex, an employer can justify that practice under the business necessity defense by demonstrating that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient functioning of its business. 131 For example, an employer may be able to establish that a height or weight requirement is a business necessity for the job of airline pilot even though the requirement acts to disqualify women disproportionately from the job. For an employment practice to constitute a business necessity, three requirements must be met: (1) the practice must identify qualities that have a "manifest relationship to the employment in question;" 133 (2) the compelling business need of using the practice must outweigh the discriminatory impact; 134 and (3) there must be no other practice that could accomplish the same business purpose with less discriminatory impact. 1 35 It is helpful here to discuss the third prong of the test first. The relevant question under this prong is whether viewer surveys can be structured to avoid incorporating sex-role expectations that are impermissible under title VIl. 136 Researchers have developed a variety of techniques for determining the sex-based nature of survey responses. For example, factorial surveys allow a researcher to "capture the complexity of real life and the conditions of real human choices and judgments" and to identify the precise factors that shape those choices and judgments. 137 A television survey could incorporate this technique to measure viewer sensitivity to an anchor's sex as a preface to the survey itself. Other techniques allow researchers to determine what sexstereotyped assumptions are held by a group of respondents. 138 The same technique allows those constructing the survey to identify specific words that are strongly sex-linked. 139 Consequently, even if viewer surveys are determined to be a necessary tool of the television the BFOQ, but on an employment practice that screens for ostensibly neutral job qualifications. These job qualifications, however, may effectively correspond to sex. For example, the requirement that all employees be over 5'7" disqualifies 95% of the female job applicants, while eliminating only 32% of the men. See Note news business, they need not incorporate sex-role expectations. 140 In judging the current blanket approval of all viewer surveys, the issue becomes whether the use of potentially sex-biased surveys is a business necessity . 141 The determination of whether sexual qualities are "manifestly related" to job performance is similar to the "essence of the job" inquiry of the BFOQ defense. 142 Just as the BFOQ defense fails because sexspecific characteristics are not crucial to the essence of the job of newscaster, so the business necessity defense fails because sex-specific qualities are not "manifestly related" to a newscaster's job performance. 1 43 Thus, there is no need to cater to the public's sex-based preferences in choosing, or imposing requirements on, the individuals who present the news.
Even if a relationship between sex-specific qualities and the job performance of newscasters is assumed, 144 the balance between the compelling needs of the business 145 and the discriminatory impact of viewer surveys tips decidedly in favor of the employee. Courts have held business practices to be business necessities only where discontinuation of the practice appears to threaten the safety or efficiency of the ed. 1971) (discussing various causes and potential solutions for response error in surveys, one of which is question wording).
140. 144. This is a very large assumption. The only way a television station could relate gender to the job performance of newscasters would be to argue that sex appeal is an essential characteristic of the job. This would mean arguing that a newscaster is more akin to a Playboy Bunny than, for example, a flight attendant. And, no matter what the argument, a television station cannot apply the sex appeal standard more strictly to one sex than the other (i.e., have personality, looks, and clothes be more important factors for female than male newscasters).
145. There is a real issue as to whether the television industry's need to use viewer surveys is as compelling as is often claimed. See notes 159-68 infra and accompanying text.
business. 146 No court has held that a business practice is a necessity because a business has a compelling need to hire only individuals who meet customer expectations. Indeed, numerous courts have struck down business practices designed to mold employees to customers' sex stereotypes on the ground that sex-specific qualities were not essential to job performance. 147 In sum, regardless of the theory the plaintiff relies on to bring her sex discrimination case, no title VII defense justifies the kind of sexplus discrimination prevalent in the television news industry today. Similarly, no defense justifies the use of viewer surveys that incorporate impermissible sexual stereotypes in employment decisions. A television news employer, like any other employer, cannot discriminate on the basis of sex in order to satisfy customer preference.
JV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF VIEWER SURVEYS
Certain policy concerns may underlie the current judicial deference to the television industry's use of viewer surveys in newscasting employment decisions. 148 First, courts may regard viewer surveys as such a fundamental business tool of the television industry 149 that they consider any judicial scrutiny of survey use to be an unwarranted encroachment on management prerogatives. Second, courts may fear that the financial loss resulting from any change in survey techniques will be catastrophic. 15° Finally, courts may doubt whether review of viewer surveys is administratively feasible.
The first policy objection to judicial scrutiny of viewer surveys reflects the judiciary's traditional hesitancy to "diminish traditional management prerogatives." 151 Courts have emphasized that surveys [Vol. 84:443 "routinely serve as the basis for personnel changes." 152 However, title VII recognizes that certain routine elements of traditional business practice may result in sex discrimination and specifically mandates courts to intervene in these situations. 153 The loss of discretion to a television station prohibited from using sex discriminatory viewer surveys is no greater than the loss of discretion, for example, to a small local restaurant forced to serve or employ a black, 154 or to a corporation forced to hire a female despite the claim that its clients prefer male companionship at football games and on hunting trips. 155 Furthermore, the scope of title VII limits the encroachment on a television station's discretion. 156 Under the statute, television stations are free to remove newscasters who do not appeal to the public for nonsex-based reasons. 157 That is, title VII does not proscribe the use of viewer surveys entirely. It requires only a modification of the current business practices of television stations fully consistent with the burdens imposed on other employers.15s
The second judicial concern, that any restriction on a television station's use of viewer surveys in employment decisions would be devastating to the station's financial well-being, may be the result of unexamined assumptions about the legitimate business needs of a television station. 159 First, it must be noted that loss of competitive edge, or even potential business failure, cannot alone justify discrimination on the basis of sex. 160 Nevertheless, if these concerns in fact influence judicial decisionmaking, it is important to recognize that claims of devastating financial impact are speculative at best. First, claims of potential lost revenue resulting from any change in survey techniques are far less convincing when viewed in terms of the entire televisionindustry. All broadcasters are subject to the same title VII standards. Thus any disadvantage imposed on a television station would be shortlived.161 Second, there remain many other avenues of competition open to television stations. 162 The current competitive focus of television stations on their news "anchors" has been created by the industry itself. Such industry-created competition cannot be used to prevent imposition of nondiscriminatory hiring practices. 163 Third, a television station's claim that it must respond to all aspects of viewer taste, even though that taste may be based on impermissible sex-role expectations, ignores the enormous role television plays in the creation, and thus the potential alteration of, societal role expectations. 164 [The] necessity test focuses on the company's ability "to perform the primary function or service it offers," not its ability to compete ....
[A] potential loss of profits or possible loss of competitive advantage following a shift to non-discriminatory hiring does not establish business necessity . . . . A rule prohibiting only financially successful enterprises from discriminating under Title VII, while allowing their less successful competitors to ignore the law, has no merit.
See also Sirota, supra note 39, at 1052 n.164 (noting the undesirability of recognizing a "business failure avoidance" BFOQ since it would "permit employers to establish differing hiring standards based on the financial condition of their respective businesses" Courts should also question whether viewer surveys are an accurate predictor of viewer behavior. 165 Predictions by other employers of potential business failure if forced to comply with title VII have proved exaggerated. That is, customers have not discontinued their patronage after imposition of nondiscriminatory employment practices.166 Examples of exaggerated claims exist even within the television industry itself. Television executives first claimed that viewers would not accept female newscasters at all. 167 Now female newscasters have been accepted, 168 and it is the more subtle aspects of employment decisions that remain potentially discriminatory. In light of the history of the television industry, there is little reason to believe that this more subtle form of sex discrimination is essential to the presentation of the news.
The final policy concern, that judicial review of viewer surveys is infeasible, proves unfounded when the method of such review is compared to the judicial inquiry requ4'ed in other title VII cases. 167. See N.Y. Times, supra note 9. 168. See id., § 1, at 44, col. 2 (quoting a news consultant to say, "I can find no research that we have done that says the audience prefers men over women in anchor roles."). 169. It may also be argued that the widespread nature of sex-role expectations indicates that all transactions between the public and employees of any business will inevitably be tinged with sex bias. For example, a salesperson who satisfies customers' sex-role expectations may attract more customers and make more sales than a similarly situated salesperson who does not conform. The extra sales may lead to preferential treatment for the successful salesperson based on stereotyped customer preference.
Such situations undoubtedly occur frequently without imposition of title VII liability. However, this is not because title VII sanctions the result, but rather because of the inherent difficulty of proving that the reason for the different treatment was stereotyped customer preference.
If the salesperson adversely affected could prove that the employer had a policy of favoring employees who conformed to sex stereotypes, the salesperson could prove discriminatory animus on the part of the employer and thereby establish a disparate treatment case. If the salesperson could demonstrate a pattern of adverse employment actions and successfully trace their cause to the employer's efforts to cater to stereotyped customer preference, the salesperson could establish a claim of disparate impact. Again, since there is no method to ascertain whether the public's whether an employment action is indeed sex based, 170 and further to differentiate impermissible stereotypes from reasonable requirements.171 Certainly the subtle influence of sex-role expectations in many employment situations is beyond the ability of courts to scrutinize.172 But subtle sex discrimination occurs not because the law sanctions it, but because it is difficult to prove. In the newscasting context, television stations explicitly rely on customer preference documented in the form of viewer surveys. Just as the surveys have thus far formed a respected, legitimate defense for television stations, they, coupled with expert testimony as to the nature of sex-role stereotypes, can provide a fact record that enables courts to discern illegal sex discrimination. Furthermore, the existence of survey techniques that compensate for impermissible levels of viewer sex bias provides the basis for a judicial remedy, 173 as well as a method for television stations to protect themselves against allegations of sex discrimination. Consequently, the judicial review of viewer surveys mandated by title VII is administratively feasible.
CONCLUSION
The widespread nature of sexual stereotypes in society indicates that sex-role expectations will often influence public reactions to a newscaster. Television stations routinely incorporate these public evaluations into newscasting employment decisions through the use of viewer surveys. The resulting employment decisions therefore present potential title VII violations. Because no sex-specific traits are necessary to the job of newscaster, television stations cannot justify explicit sex-based employment actions. Furthermore, viewer surveys may feasibly be restructured to eliminate impermissible sexual assumptions. · buying habits are based on stereotyped criteria, the case would be virtually impossible to establish.
The television industry, however, has an institutionalized policy of measuring and reacting directly to viewer preference. Employees evaluated by monitored and tabulated viewer judgments are in a better position to demonstrate that the criteria used to judge their performance embody sexual stereotypes. A judicial insistence that television stations reveal the underlying criteria of employee evaluations is much more fair and feasible than in other business settings since the direct measurement of viewer preference is an institutionalized part of television employment decisionmaking. 172. See Taub, supra note 15, at 355 (identifying the reasons that underlying role expectations are often difficult to discern in evaluations of individuals: "Bias is, first of all, frequently unconscious. Second, since the focus is on the individual rather than group performance or capability, often the easier explanation is that the individual is at fault. Third, bias is further disguised by the expression of judgment in terms that appear both neutral and relevant.").
173. See notes 136-41 supra and accompanying text.
Consequently, a television station cannot justify the use of viewer surveys that fail to compensate for sexual bias. Finally, both the potential impact on a television station from imposition of title VII liability and the judicial inquiry required to examine viewer surveys is comparable to that in other employment discrimination settings. Therefore, the content of viewer surveys is a proper, feasible, and necessary issue for courts to review under title VII.
-Leslie S. Gielow
